Counting of qualia exterminated the zombies

In philosophy of mind, the famous mental experiment known as philosophical zombie is used to try to refute materialism. Philosophical zombies are hypothetical entities, imaginary beings identical to humans in all physical and behavioral aspects. Imagine a human who acts, speaks and responds to stimuli like any other, but internally has no consciousness, qualia, sensations or feelings.
The idea of philosophical zombies was introduced by philosopher David Chalmers in 1996 to challenge the materialist view of the mind, which holds that consciousness is a product of the physical brain. Chalmers argues that if it is possible to imagine a philosophical zombie, then consciousness cannot simply be reduced to matter.
Chalmers says that even if we could fully explain how the brain works in physical and chemical terms, we still would not have explained the subjective experience of consciousness. How does the physical brain generate qualia, the unique conscious and qualitative experiences of each individual? This gap between physical explanation and subjective experience is known as the hard problem of consciousness.
One materialist answer I proposed is called “qualia counting.”
Consciousness arises as an emergent property of complex neural activity.
Neurons, without understanding the concept of numbers, “count” information. This underlying count can explain qualia, subjective experiences such as colors, sounds, tastes, feelings, and emotions. Each qualia arises from the activation of specific neurons for each function. For example, neurons “count” and classify the electromagnetic spectrum, associating each value with a specific color.
Qualia counting states that consciousness arises from the activation of individual qualia, the sensory qualities such as colors, sounds, and tastes. Each qualia, according to this theory, has a specific number of neurons activated in different areas of the brain. For example, imagine that you are looking at a red apple. Qualia counts suggest that the redness of the apple is represented by the activation of a specific number of neurons in the area of the brain responsible for color vision.
If we accept that consciousness emerges from counting qualia, then a philosophical zombie, who is identical to humans in terms of behavior and brain function but lacks consciousness, must be impossible to exist. According to qualia counting, consciousness arises from the neural activity associated with qualia, and if the behavior and brain function of a philosophical zombie are identical to that of a conscious being, then they too should exhibit consciousness. Therefore, qualia counting could be seen as a materialist response to the problem of philosophical zombies, suggesting that consciousness is an emergent property of neural activity and cannot be separated from brain functioning. Thus, philosophical zombies would be considered impossible within this perspective, since the lack of consciousness contradicts the supposed behavioral and cerebral identity with conscious beings. So, in the materialist camp, at least for now we can declare that “qualia counting” has exterminated the philosophical zombies.